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ABSTRACT
The study uses stress testing to determine the need, if any, for additional capital and/orprovisioning for commercial banks in Botswana. The aim is to probe the use of supervisorystress testing as a mitigating factor to some concerns that have been raised with the
Basel capital adequacy ratio (CAR) following the 2007-9 global financial crisis. During the crisis,
some financial institutions failed or required some form of government assistance, amid having
met the minimum CAR requirements prior to the crisis. This led to increased public scrutiny
and a loss of confidence in financial regulation. As a result, some scholars have argued that the
Basel capital framework is not sufficient as a measure of capital adequacy and as such advocate
for the adoption of stress testing to overcome the shortcomings. Specific reference is often made
to the success of the subsequent SCAP (US) and CEBS (EU) stress tests that are conceived to
have helped restore public confidence as they revealed several oversight loopholes in the existing
Basel methodology for the determination of adequate capital for financial institutions. In this
regard, this paper considers the context of Botswana, where, even though banks withstood the
financial crisis with a relatively strong stance, the economy remains concentrated with heavy
dependence on the mining sector. This increases macroeconomic vulnerability and banking sector
risks and hence intensifies the need to ensure that banks have sufficient capital holdings at all
times. The study adopts an accounting-based approach to stress testing by applying shocks for
credit, interest rate, foreign exchange and liquidity risks with the CAR as the main metric. A
combined scenario stress test revealed that a collective change in provisions, NPLs, interest rate
and exchange rate, that resulted in a decline in CAR from 19.4 to 18.6 post-shock. The available
capital remains adequate even following assumed stress conditions. However, the stress test has
revealed weaknesses in credit risk and foreign exchange risk as some banks’ capital adequacy
fell below the 15 percent minimum. Furthermore, the scenario analysis showed the need for a
P22 million capital injection into the banking system, should the tested scenarios occur. As far as
can be reasonably established, this kind of study has not been published before for Botswana. As
such, this paper lays groundwork for future studies particularly relating to the formulation of
scenarios that can better reflect the risk profile of the Botswana banking system.
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The role of financial intermediation establishes banks as facilitators of spending andinvestment in an economy and, as such, vital to the stability of the financial system.Despite this, banks remain susceptible to risks and possible failure. A bank failure can
have far reaching and detrimental effects. This has created the need for regulators to strive to
maintain stable financial systems at all times. It is through the use of banking regulation that
regulators are able to respond to the increased risk that comes with financial institutions’ growth
and progression with the times.
For a long time, banking regulation has been dominated by the use of the Basel rules developed by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the Bank for International Settlements.
Amid their success in many respects, the regulations have had to undergo several revisions
over the years as it often emerged that some critical regulatory aspects had been overlooked.
Schuermann (2014:718) postulates that neither a firm’s internal economic capital nor regulatory
capital models can guarantee failure prevention especially because it is the responsibility of any
firm to gauge its probability of failure through its risk appetite. Some scholars, including Caprio,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2010), have criticised the Basel stipulated capital adequacy measures
following several defaults or near defaults by institutions 1 that were considered adequately
capitalised prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The institutions consistently reported Tier 1
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) at an average of 8 percent, relative to Basel I’s 4 percent minimum
threshold (Furlong, 2011:2). This resulted in a loss of confidence in many large banking organisa-
tions by depositors and investors alike, with banking regulation losing some credibility in the
process.
1Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers under the Securities and Exchange Commission and Basel II capital rules;
Wachovia under the Federal Reserve and using Basel I rules; Washington Mutual under the Office of Thrift Supervision
and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [BCBS] (2010:4) also acknowledged weaknesses
of the existing framework at the time, attributing the crisis to excessive on and off-balance
sheet leverage, a gradual erosion of the quality of capital as well as insufficient liquidity which
hampered the system from absorbing systemic trading and credit losses. Regulators have since
sought other ways of improving the assessment of capital adequacy in financial institutions. One
such way is the adoption of periodic stress tests as part of the supervisory process (Schuermann,
2014:718). One scholar, Wall (2014:266) argues that the supervisory stress tests carried out
following the financial crisis, through the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) in
the US and by the Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CEBS) in the EU, helped restore
confidence in financial regulation. As such, Wall (2014:275) advocates for the adoption of stress
testing over the reliance on Basel capital ratios mainly due to the latter’s inability to capture a
deterioration in asset values, which leads to overstated regulatory capital that does not reflect
the economic condition of a financial institution.
Supervisory stress tests are used by policy makers and researchers to not only understand
vulnerabilities in the financial system, but quantify them as well (Čihák, 2007:4). By recognizing
the inadequacies of the universal Basel capital ratios and taking into account Wall (2014)’s
advocacy for the active adoption of stress testing in the determination of capital adequacy for
financial institutions, this paper seeks to explore the value of stress testing through a comparison
of bank capitalisation before and after stress testing, with a focus on the banking system of
Botswana.
1.2 Overview of the Basel Accords
The formal implementation of the regulations in 1988 introduced the Basel I Accord, which
adopted the use of a capital ratio to measure banks’ capital holdings against their assets adjusted
for credit risk (risk-weighted assets). The ratio had to equal at least 8 percent and comprised
two components; Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 (core) capital, regarded as having the highest
quality and ability to absorb losses, includes common equity and retained earnings while Tier 2
capital represents the supplementary capital with relatively lesser quality such as subordinated
debt and reserves. The risk-weighted assets were computed by allocating risk weightings using a
categorisation based on the counterparty involved. Larson (2011: 26) describes such a mechanism
as arbitrary, overly broad, and not sensitive enough to the unique risks associated with individual
assets held by a bank. Basel I was updated in 1996 to include capital provisioning for market
risk in addition to credit risk.
Due to concerns raised over the efficacy of the Basel I rules, the Basel II2 rules were introduced
2...also referred to as the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised
Framework; available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf
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in 2004. One outstanding feature of Basel II is the introduction of a three-pillar system of
minimum capital requirements, supervisory oversight and market discipline. However, Basel II
also faced objections particularly during the financial crisis relating to its lapses in reliability
and objectivity in the determination of asset risk. Larson (2011:30) cited another problem as
lack of consistency particularly in credit risk assessment thus allowing banks to maintain lower
capital amounts during economic peaks which resulted in insufficient cushion during economic
downturns. Such problems led to the subsequent adoption of Basel III3 which was released in
2010 for full implementation by 2019. Basel III ushered in a new definition of regulatory capital
which is more restrictive and emphasised quality of capital. With Basel III, overall minimum
capital requirement becomes 10.5 percent, which includes the original 8 percent plus a capital
conservation buffer equal to at least 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 2010:64). As
with the first two installments of the Basel accord, Basel III’s higher capital requirements and
complexity has prompted prospects of another Basel installation, Basel IV.
1.3 Overview of Supervisory Stress Testing
Supervisory stress testing is a risk management technique aimed at assessing the vulnerability
and resilience of individual banks or a financial system to severe but plausible events or shocks
(Blaschke et al., 2001:4; Oura & Schumacher, 2012:8; Schuermann, 2014:718). The use of stress
testing often complements other analytical tools such as early warning systems and Financial
Soundness Indicators (FSIs). Early warning systems are often used for prediction of banking
crises according to Davis & Karim (2008:89) while FSIs are macroprudential indicators used to
assess the financial health and soundness of financial institutions including their corporate and
household counterparts (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2006:1). The BCBS (2009:7)con-
siders stress tests necessary for a forward-looking assessment of risk, overcoming limitations of
models and historical data; supporting internal and external communication; feeding into capital
and liquidity planning procedures; informing the setting of banks’ risk tolerance and facilitating
the development of risk mitigation plans across a range of stressed conditions. Further, they are
considered especially important after periods of benign economic and financial conditions when
complacency and underpricing of risk may be prevalent.
A supervisory authority may employ the bottom-up approach which involves the aggregation
of the results of banks, own portfolio stress tests using internal data and models. Alternatively,
they may adopt the top-down approach which involves using sample data of some or all the
financial institutions in the system and common assumptions(Čihák, 2007:12). Most of the
authorities conduct stress tests using both approaches as they may be used to cross-examine
each other. Nonetheless, for this paper, only the top down approach will be used as it is regarded




as relatively quicker to implement with less analytical complexity (Oura & Schumacher, 2012:14).
Moreover, following the financial crisis, several financial regulation reforms published including
(Turner Report, 2009; The Geneva Report on the World Economy, 2009; de Larosiere Report,
2009; US Treasury White Paper, 2009), have recommended the use of the top down approach
going forward. Macro stress tests also form a critical part of the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) instituted by the IMF and the World Bank. In macro stress testing, financial
system stability is measured by the extent to which a portfolio, individual institution or group
of institutions is capable of withstanding external shocks from the macroeconomy (Gadanecz
& Jayaram, 2008:366). Since 1999, the FSAP has carried out stress tests in several countries
around the world and a few large economies in Africa such as South Africa which was included
for the first time in 2008 (Havrylchyk, 2010:2). The FSAP stress tests have not reached Botswana,
however, the IMF Article IV mission has previously made a recommendation 4 for the stress
testing of banks’ lending, particularly to the household sector.
1.4 Research Problem
The objective of banking regulation is centred around the need for banks to hold capital consistent
with the level of risk undertaken. The Basel accord has been established as the standard for
determining capital adequacy for banks mainly because of its standardised approach using a CAR
that fosters easier comparability of financial institutions and systems. However, the 2007-2009
global financial crisis saw some institutions which were classified as adequately capitalised as
per the Basel standards, undergo failure or near failure, which led scholars to question the ability
of the Basel accord to ensure that banks hold the sufficient capital buffers even in periods of
economic distress (Čih’ak, 2007:53; Haldane, 2009:4; Wall, 2014:266). Notably is the criticism
by Wall (2014:274), who also discounts the Basel accord’s ability to determine the necessary
capitalisation for banks and advocates for the adoption of supervisory stress tests as they were
able to identify undercapitalised banks in the US following the crisis. Haldane (2009:4) also
laments the complexity of the Basel III standards which he argues have shifted focus from
simplicity to increased risk sensitivity making them complex. The constant evolution of the Basel
accord provides an indication that regulators are faced with an impasse of having to strike a
balance between simplicity and complexity which diminishes comparability among financial
institutions.
As the Basel accords continue to undergo changes and improvements, their ability to prevent
another financial crisis remains unascertainable. Having always played less of a role in prudential
supervision (Wall, 2013:1), stress testing is being presented as an alternative approach towards
ensuring that banks hold sufficient capital at all times. This study presents an opportunity to
4see in IMF (2016:21); available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16103.pdf
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analyse the dynamics and value of stress testing as a tool to ensure that the banking system
holds sufficient capital resources that would avert the likelihood of a bank failure and enough
to alleviate future crises. This is a legitimate interrogation as stress testing programs often
tend to require a substantial investment in resources, monetary and otherwise. By placing focus
on Botswana, the aim is to bring more understanding to the process of stress testing financial
systems, especially given the concentrated nature of the developing economy, which can elusively
harbour potential risks for the banking system. The study has been motivated by the need to
ascertain the resilience and the ability of the banks in Botswana to withstand an economic
deterioration as purported by the current strong Basel-based CARs of most banks.
1.5 Research Objective
The aim of the study is to determine whether supervisory stress tests can mitigate the shortcom-
ings of the Basel accord in establishing adequate capital levels for banks in Botswana. The study
is guided by the following objectives;
• To determine the system’s capital needs using stress testing;
• To explore, comparatively, capital adequacy determination under stress testing as well as
the Basel approaches.
1.6 Research Questions
Some of the ideas the study intends to probe include;
• Are the current CARs as determined using the Basel standards sufficient?
• Would a stress test reveal the need for additional capital in the system?
• Would supervisory stress tests mitigate Basel accord shortcomings in establishing bank
capital adequacy in Botswana?
1.7 Contribution
This paper seeks to contribute to the limited literature on approaches to supervisory risk as-
sessment in less developed economies, to ensure that financial stability is attained through
proper capitalisation of banks in order to improve the resilience of banking systems to unforeseen
macroeconomic shocks. The study is relevant for policy relating to bank supervision in Botswana,
which is a middle-income country with a concentrated economy, a state of affairs which can
translate to increased macroeconomic risk. Simple mechanical exercises are often adopted for
stress testing less advanced financial systems and usually involve directly shocking balance sheet
5
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and income statement items using macro-economic factors (Havrylchyk, 2010:4). The study uses
a stress testing model developed by Čihák (2014) for less complex banking systems and is, as
such, regarded as ideal for Botswana.
1.8 Limitations of the Study
The major limitation of the study is data availability, which is a common problem for developing
and transition economies (Havrylchyk, 2010:4). Of all the 10 commercial banks studied, only
three are listed and hence some of the data necessary to carry out the stress testing exercise is
not publicly available for most of the banks. The stress test, nonetheless, adopted an aggregate
focus, where only collective commercial banks’ data was used. This, however, means the results
are deprived of the more detailed bank by bank analysis which would provide more insight into
the system’s vulnerabilities. An analysis involving individual banks is deemed necessary because,
even though the system has shown to be adequately capitalised and resilient, some banks could
possess considerable unique weaknesses and as such remain prone to increased risk should there
be a deterioration of macroeconomic conditions. The model also uses simplified assumptions to
accommodate the relatively less developed nature of the financial system, however, this tends
to take away robustness in the processing of shocks. Lastly, there is limited past research on
stress testing of financial systems for less developed countries, hence benchmarking, such as
on assumption formulation, often refers to cases of developed markets, which are structurally
different.
Furthermore, the interpretation of stress testing results also takes into consideration the
various theoretical and practical limits. Firstly, the use of a system-wide stress test means that
the assessment does not cover idiosyncratic institutional risks in terms of asset quality and even
operational issues. Secondly, aggregate-level stress testing only provides approximate results
as it does not take into account the responses, of both the individual banks and supervisors, to
shocks in the financial system ( Čihák & Heřmánek, 2005:4). Finally, the choice of risks selected
for modelling is largely dependent on the availability of required data. For instance, due to the
unavailability of sufficient data, only simple liquidity tests have been carried out.
1.9 Organisation
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; Chapter 2 discusses the general theoretical back-
ground relating to approaches to supervisory risk assessment in terms of the Basel capital accord
and application of stress tests, while making references to the 2007-9 global financial crisis.
Chapter 3 describes the economic climate of Botswana and its interaction with the banking
system to provide justification as to why the banking system in Botswana needs to be stress
tested. Chapter 4 outlines the research approach including the method and data adopted for this
study. Chapter 5 describes the stress testing model employed in carrying out the process of stress
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testing the banking system. Chapter 6 presents the results of the stress testing exercise followed
by an analysis in Chapter 7 where a comparison between the pre-stress and post-stress CAR is











BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the theoretical background of supervisory risk assessment with afocus on stress testing as a regulatory tool that can be used to overcome the shortcomingsof the Basel capital framework in ensuring that banks continuously hold adequate capital.
The section discusses the background of both stress testing and the Basel accord by comparing the
two in terms of strengths and shortfalls as well as why the Basel accord is considered inadequate
by some scholars. Finally, this review will narrow the discussion to supervisory risk assessment
in Africa in order to relate it to the context of Botswana, whose banking system will be the subject
of the study.
As a result of globalisation, financial innovation and financial sector deregulation, banking
business has become more complex and especially risky. It is for this reason that various initiatives
have been geared towards the development of more structured and quantified assessments of
the risks faced by financial institutions. These efforts are collectively termed supervisory risk
assessment and entail the identification, measurement and control of risk exposures existing in
the financial system (Sahajwala & van den Bergh, 2000:1). When the balance sheets of banks
are affected by a common asset shock, a crisis occurs (Acharya, Engle & Pierret, 2014:37). Bank
failure comes at a cost owing to government bailouts and in some instances depositors’ insurance.
In addition, when the financial system is undercapitalised it becomes susceptible to externalities
that spill over to the rest of the economy (Acharya et al., 2017:3). For a long time, bank regulation
has placed emphasis on the positive aspects of banks’ capital (Barth, Caprio & Levine, 2004:215;
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache & Merrouche, 2013:1147). This is because capital serves as a
cushion against losses and ultimately bank failure. Bank supervisors largely rely on ratios to
evaluate the capital adequacy of financial institutions.
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2.2 The Evolution of the Basel Capital Framework
After World War II, many regulatory agencies used a variety of ratios, however, without any
specific requirements (Kim & Santomero, 1988:1220). The ratios helped supervisors to compare
institutions against each other while keeping the individual banks from reducing their capital
ratios below their peers. However, this system could not prevent widespread declines in cap-
ital ratios which eventually became a problem (Wall, 2014:267). Furthermore, the regulatory
standards varied from one country to the other, which resulted in similar exposures receiving
different treatments depending on the jurisdiction. This capital regulation form of assigning
numeric requirements based on a leverage ratio was denounced by Kapstein (1991:16) as "hope-
lessly simplistic". In the late 80s, bank supervisors began investing substantial resources in the
development and implementation of capital adequacy requirements as a primary prudential
regulatory tool (Kim & Santomero, 1988:1220). These efforts have led to the development of
regulatory capital framework of the BCBS, which had a threefold objective; (a) to ensure that
the amount of capital buffers that banks hold is congruent to their respective risk levels; (b) to
standardise capital measures across jurisdictions and (c) to foster comparability of capital levels
between different banks (Goodhart, 2011:147). The BCBS’ work on developing regulation aimed
at combating banking risk can be broken down in to five regulatory waves.
The first wave involved the publication of the 1975 Basel Concordat5, which provided guidance
on cross border regulation relating to banks’ foreign establishments with a focus on supervisory
cooperation, liquidity and solvency management (BCBS, 1975:1-5). The Concordat ran its course
until 1986 amid several bank failures6, the 1973 oil shock as well as the Iran-Iraq war of 1982
(Penikas, 2015:15). In December 1987, the second regulatory wave began with the publication of
a consultative document on the Basel I Accord which was adopted in 1988. Basel I established
a formal basis for banking risk regulation using a CAR. Between 1988 and 1996, Basel I was
periodically amended to address changes in banks’ activities. The most notable change is the
introduction of capital provisioning for market risk, in addition to credit risk, through the Market
Risk Amendment of 1996 (Amendment). The Amendment also included a revision of countries to
be allocated a zero-risk weighting (BCBS, 2005a:9). The third regulatory wave commenced with
the announcement of the revision of Basel I to create Basel II. According to Penikas (2015:16),
the third wave experienced the most turbulent economic environment owing to the 1997 Asian
crisis, the 1998 Russian sovereign debt default, 2001 dotcom bubble breach as well as the 2007
subprime mortgage plunge.
The Basel II framework’s main objectives were to increase the scope, flexibility and risk sensitiv-
ity of capital charges by providing approaches that determine requirements for major banking
5see in http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00a.pdf
6Notably, Herstatt Bank in 1974 which was overcome by settlement risk.
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risks regardless of size and sophistication levels (BCBS, 2006:2). A three-pillar system was also
introduced comprising minimum capital requirements as Pillar 1, which relates to the minimum
regulatory capital that a bank must hold to cover its exposure to credit, market and operational
risk (BCBS, 2006:12). Pillar 2 complemented Pillar 1 by outlining a supervisory review process
which allows for capital requirements to be tailored to each bank’s risk profile including the
calculation of any further regulatory capital that may be needed. Public disclosures that enhance
market discipline are covered under Pillar 3. The supervisory expectation is that banks which
the market judges to have increased their risk profiles without adequate capital backing will
have their securities unattractive in debt and equity markets and as such compel them to modify
either their risk profile or capital base (BCBS, 2006:3). However, the financial crisis revealed
several problems with the Basel II standard including condemnation of the rating agencies’
flawed allocation of ratings to securitised products using faulty methodologies, apparent bribery
and in some cases, conflict of interest (Wojtowicz, 2011:4). This left some banks undercapitalised
relative to their true exposures. Between 2004 and 2009, the BCBS published several documents7
providing Basel II implementation guidance as well as setting up the Standards Implementation
Group to support the implementation process in different countries.
This paved way to the fourth regulatory wave which was short-lived and started with the intro-
duction of the Basel III accord that was created in response to the financial crisis. Revisions8 to
the Basel II accord began in December 2009 with a Basel III consultative paper, which included
inter alia; additional capital requirements, a proposal for quantification for liquidity as well as
the introduction of a leverage ratio of 3 percent (BCBS, 2010:63). As per the BCBS (2010:5), the
objectives of Basel III include strengthening the quality and consistency of regulatory capital,
improving transparency and risk coverage as well as ensuring that capital requirements are
able to dampen financial shocks. The Basel III capital requirements include a minimum common
equity, Tier 1 and total capital requirements of at least 4.5 percent, 6 percent and 8 percent of
risk-weighted assets, respectively; the elimination of capital instruments that no longer qualify
as regulatory capital plus a capital conservation buffer, expected to reach 2.5 percent of risk-
weighted assets by January 2019. A counter-cyclical capital buffer of between 0 percent and 2.5
percent of risk-weighted assets will also be implemented as per national circumstances (BCBS,
2010:7).
Criticism of Basel III has ignited prospects of Basel IV. According to Amorello (2016:24), the four
main weaknesses of the Basel III framework are; (a) extreme complexity of the requirements; (b)
the use of capital adequacy computations based on banks’ internal models; (c) failure to capture
7See documents available at http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/tid_23/index.htm
8Two documents published in July 2009: see Enhancements to the Basel II Framework (available at http:
//www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.htm) and Revisions the Basel II market risk framework (available at http://www.
bis.org/publ/bcbs158.htm)
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all off-balance sheet risks and (d) incomprehensive market disclosure requirements. Amorello
(2016:29) further asserts that due to several publications9 of reforms post Basel III, there is
reasonable ground for the anticipation of a Basel IV package aimed at enhancing the inadequacies
of Basel III. According to Dormans & Pit (2014:16), Basel IV would help reduce reliance on
complex internal models, standardise comprehensive data collection and reporting, increase
transparency in risk reporting, make credit rating agencies less fundamental to regulatory credit
risk assessment as well as a possible increase of capital requirements for banks. Penikas (2015:17)
posits that all the post-Basel III regulation qualifies to be regarded as the fifth regulatory wave
as it consists of regulatory proposals that are not consistent with Basel III.
2.3 The Role of Supervisory Stress Testing
Originally an engineering concept, supervisory stress testing is used to describe various tech-
niques and procedures that gauge financial institutions’ potential vulnerability to exceptional but
plausible events (Committee on the Global Financial System [CGFS], 2000:6; Borio, Drehmann &
Tsatsaronis, 2014:4). Exceptionality indicates that they should be low probability events, however,
not too farfetched as to exceed the confines of plausibility as this can limit the importance given
to the results of the tests. Hilbers, Jones and Slack (2004:4) also describe stress testing as a rough
estimate of how the value of a portfolio changes when large shocks are effected to its risk factors.
The inclusion of the term "rough estimate" here, is said to dilute the perception that stress testing
is a precise tool that can be used with scientific accuracy. Schuermann (2014:722) indicates that
stress testing was traditionally performed on the trading book and not necessarily the banking
book mainly because the latter is dominated by credit risk and quantitative credit risk modelling
is itself a newer discipline. Similarly, Dovern, Meier and Vilsmeier (2010:1844) point out that
macroeconomic stress testing is also a relatively new research area, however, following the 2007-9
global financial crisis, stress tests are fast becoming standard tools used by regulators to assess
the resilience of the financial system (Acharya, Engle & Pierret, 2014:37).
According to Blaschke et al. (2001:6), internationally active banks began applying stress tests in
the early 90s but were officially sanctioned for use with the Amendment of 1996. The Amend-
ment permits banks to use their own internal models to measure their capital requirements
for market risk, subject to certain conditions, inter alia; the requirement to have a rigorous
stress testing program (BCBS, 2005a:35). A major impediment with this requirement as noted
by Wall (2014:270) is that most banks only conducted stress tests that were largely limited to
their trading books. On the supervisory front, Trapanese (2009:7) puts forward that there is yet
9Revisions to the Standardised Approach for credit risk - Second consultative document (Dec 2015) (available
at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d347.htm); Minimum Capital Requirements for Market Risk (Jan 2016) (avail-
able at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d352.htm ); Standardised Measurement Approach for operational risk -
consultative document (March 2016) (available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d355.htm)
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to be a widely-accepted analytical risk assessment framework to measure financial stability. In
measuring macroeconomic vulnerability, stress tests can also be used to simulate portfolios of
individual financial institutions in what is referred to as micro stress testing (Borio, Drehmann
& Tsatsaronis, 2014:4). According to Hilbers, Jones and Slack (2004:1), macro- and micro- stress
tests complement each other as they allow for a broader analysis while leveraging the existing
expertise found in different financial institutions.
Stress testing programs can be resource intensive and as such it is only reasonable that the
adoption of such a process be justified. One of the main benefits of system-wide stress tests is that
they provide policymakers with insights on the financial system vulnerabilities, and implications
thereof (Hilbers, Jones & Slack, 2004:3). As indicated by IMF (2003:4), system stress tests often
involve a series of consultations between banks and regulators as well as effect a standard
approach to risk assessment while taking into account macroeconomic activity. Hilbers, Jones
and Slack (2004:3) further explain that the stress testing process can help supervisors identify
weaknesses in data collection and reporting, cross-check the performance of individual firms’
risk models as well as improve their expertise of risk, based on the relationship between the
financial sector and the macroeconomy. Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014:12) posit that
macro stress tests help discipline thinking about financial stability for all stakeholders involved.
As also noted by Acharya, Engle and Pierret (2014:38), stress tests can help to align the market’s
perception of risk with the likelihood of bank failure. Finally, Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis
(2014:4) propose that for stress tests to be effective, they have to be tailor made for a specific
purpose.
2.4 Are the Basel Standards Enough? - Wall (2014)
Prior to and during the financial crisis several institutions10 failed or needed some form of
government assistance albeit meeting the minimum capital adequacy requirements(Demirgüç-
Kunt, Detragiache & Merrouche, 2013:1149; Schuermann, 2014:717). This cast aspersions on the
efficacy of the Basel capital regulations in place at the time. In his critique of the performance
of the Basel ratios in the financial crisis, Wall (2014:266) argues that the problem was not that
banks were reporting low Basel CARs, but that the regulation that had been entrusted with en-
suring that banks maintained sufficient capital at all times, was unable to do so. Wall (2014:266)
further contends that it is for this reason that regulators resorted to stress tests as a way of
addressing stakeholders’ concerns about financial institutions’ capital adequacy. Wall (2014:274)
has advocated for the adoption of stress testing in banking risk regulation, a case argued from
the perspective of what it is that stress tests can do that the Basel ratios do not.
10including Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, American International Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, Dexia, Lloyds
and Fortis
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Wall (2014:266) asserts that stress testing uses forward looking scenarios whereas the Basel
capital ratios rely on historical risk distributions and data to estimate bank specific distribution
of losses. Moreover, the Basel measures are based on the supposition that for bank capital to be
regarded as adequate, it should on average, be able to cover unexpected losses of a bank in excess
of available total capital "once in a thousand years11", with a 99.9 percent confidence level (BCBS,
2005b:11). Wall (2014:266) argues that this assumption increases the risk of using prevailing
benign economic conditions as a yardstick which is likely to lead to an underestimation of poten-
tial losses. In contrast, however, supervisory stress tests allow supervisors to specify conditions
against which banks’ capital positions will be tested. This provides allowance for construction of
even random scenarios that may not necessarily be based on economic activity of the recent past
(Wall, 2014:275). Wall (2014:275) further indicates that Basel ratios use capital figures computed
as per accounting standards which may harbour unrecognised losses in asset values as compared
to stress tests which allow for capital to be adjusted against a specified stress scenario. Moreover,
even though they use accounting measures of capital as well, stress tests can use a longer time
horizon to allows for the eventual recognition of losses by banks. Wall (2014:266) further indicates
that for these reasons, bank asset values were criticised for not reflecting security valuations
in full during the financial crisis. This is also supported by the results of a study by Furlong
(2011:3), in which a comparison between banks’ book value and market values of capital dur-
ing the crisis, revealed that the Basel ratios were calculated based on inflated estimates of capital.
Finally, Wall (2014:274) describes Basel ratios as static and unconditional because they measure
capital adequacy at a single point in time without consideration for possible future economic
developments. The scholar maintains that although the Basel ratios provide definitions for
items necessary for capital adjustments, these values are deduced directly from individual
banks’ financial statements and as such have been measured through "a process that is totally
independent from the one used to calculate Basel ratios". Financial statements are prepared
following a set of accounting standards, a process which is independent of the determination
of regulatory capital as stipulated by the Basel capital standards. By contrast, Wall (2014:274)
describes stress tests as dynamic because the adjustment for risk takes place in the capital
itself. In line with Wall (2014)’s arguments, Blum (1999:768) discounts capital requirements
as inducing risky behaviours in banks. Because supervisors use regulatory capital as one of
the tools to reduce insolvency risk in financial institutions, Blum (1999:768) argues that this
may not necessarily be the case due to the inverse relationship between a regulatory capital
and profitability. Therefore, if expected future profitability is lower, a bank may have a lesser
incentive to avoid default. Moreover, because capital regulation increases the value of equity, a
bank may find it optimal to increase its risk appetite in order to boost returns.
11see in An explanatory note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
irbriskweight.pdf (BCBS 2005b:11).
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2.5 Supervisory Risk Assessment in Africa
This paper studies the impact of stress tests on the banking system of Botswana, a middle-income
economy in Africa. According to Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004:215), there is limited evidence
that the international best practices in banking regulation will succeed in countries with different
institutional and political environments. In developing quantitative risk management models,
most studies have placed focus on developed economies (Barrell et al., 2010:2256). This means
most low-income countries, including those in Africa tend to receive little specific attention related
to building of early warning systems and stress testing frameworks that are tailored for their
economies (Caggiano, Calice & Leonida, 2014:258; Triki et al., 2017:184). This, perhaps, is the
case because most of the financial distress of the past two decades took place outside Africa.
According to Nyantakyi and Sy (2015:14), between 1970 and 2012, Africa experienced, on average,
one systemic banking crisis per year while the equivalent figure for the rest of the world is 2.4. As
a consequence, relevant empirical literature seems to have devoted less attention to middle and
low-income countries, albeit history showing that these countries’ episodes of crises take much
longer to be resolved (Caggiano, Calice & Leonida, 2014:258). It is important to note that during
the 2007-9 global financial crisis, banking systems in many African countries have, on average,
been able to remain stable. The resilience has been attributed to improved macroeconomic policies
(Caggiano, Calice & Leonida, 2014:258), as well as stringent regulatory frameworks which have
bolstered prudential requirements (Triki et al., 2017:187). Nyantakyi and Sy (2015:1), however,
indicate that vulnerabilities are likely to become more pronounced in developing countries as
financial deepening increases and financial transactions become more sophisticated. Nyantakyi
and Sy (2015:15) have also observed that African countries seem reluctant in the implementation
of the recent Basel III rules, attributing the position to underrepresentation in the BCBS as
well as the notion that the rules are less relevant for Africa. Another factor suggested is the
low integration of Africa with global financial markets which makes Basel II and III rules too
complex for most of the banking systems. Lastly, Beck et al. (2011:242) and Triki et al. (2017:184)
conclude that due to the uniqueness of its financial system, it is up to Africa to define its priorities
in terms of banking regulation and supervision.
2.6 Stress Testing Insights from the Global Financial Crisis
Undoubtedly, the 2008 global financial crisis will remain a future standard for an extended
period of time (Borio, Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014:5). Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010:21)
contend that every financial crisis is unique and that there are probably flaws in the current
financial system that regulators have not yet identified. The value of stress tests is often related
to the success of SCAP after the crisis, however, the ability of the tests to remain valuable in the
next crisis cannot be ascertained. Wall (2014:275) expounds two possible reasons for this asser-
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tion. Firstly that, Basel ratios may become improved and a better measure of capital before the
next crisis. Secondly, the problem of Basel’s reliance on accounting measures of capital could be
resolved as the major accounting standard setting bodies, the International Accounting Standards
Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board, have been engaged to devise ways of averting
some accounting problems from the crisis (Wall, 2014:278). However, there is no guarantee that
banks themselves will address their own problems relating to timely deterioration of their assets’
values. Wall (2014:279) nonetheless, acknowledges that should the necessary changes be effected
to the Basel regulations, the value added of stress testing may greatly diminish.
Another important lesson is that the motive and level of risk appetite should also be clearly
reflected in scenario design. For instance, the need to recognise or avoid recognising potential
economic losses should be clearly indicated as was the case in the SCAP and CEBS, respectively
(Schuermann, 2014:722). Wall (2014:280) describes a problem such as a possible reluctance by
supervisors to use scenarios that may reveal severe systemic problems, banking on the expectation
that financial institutions would be able to rebuild capital adequacy on their own. For instance,
for the CEBS test, it was revealed that a severely stressful scenario may reveal weakness which
supervisors would need to take prompt action on, however, that may well be a false alarm that
would undermine stakeholder confidence in the banking system. This was particularly necessary
because, given the financial difficulties by some EU member states, there was no provision to
cover capital shortfalls or even resolve systemically important banks, should they fail the test.
Stress testing, as such, requires supervisory caution because it has a bearing on one of the core
role of supervisors: to ensure confidence in the financial system.
2.7 Building Blocks of Stress Testing Models
The process of macro stress testing commences with an assumed shock to the system. The
shock is then related to macroeconomic variables such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
interest rates and inflation using a macroeconomic model. Thereafter, the shocked variables
are linked to banks financial statement data using the model. The effect of the shock on the
banks’ financial performance is estimated in terms of minimum capital adequacy (Henry & Kok,




≥ ẍ)= f (X t, zt) (1)
Source:(Sorge, 2004:3-4; Vukelić, 2011:8)
where Ẍ t is the set of past realisations of the macroeconomic variable X; Z t is the set of past
realisations of the other relevant factors; Ÿt+1 is the measure of distress for the financial system;
Ẍ t+1; Ẍ is the condition for stress test scenario to occur; Ω( Ÿt+1Ẍ t+1 ≥ ẍ) is the uncertain future
realisation of a measure of distress in the event of the shock; Ω(.) is the risk metric used to
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compare financial system vulnerability across institutions and scenarios and; f(.) is the loss
function that maps the initial set of shocks to the final impact measured on the financial sector,s
portfolio.
2.7.1 Objectives
The main goal of macro stress tests is for bank supervisors to identify system vulnerabilities and
overall risk exposures that may affect financial stability. Drehmann (2008:60) outlines the three
main objectives of stress testing as (a) to provide validation for perceived risk and vulnerabilities;
(b) to aid decision making as the results are used to inform business decisions and future plans;
and (c) through the results, to communicate the overall positions of the financial institutions to
the target audience. Vukelić (2011:10) also writes that the financial institutions to be analysed
should also be clearly defined with a possible distinction drawn in terms of ownership, size and
performance as seen in (Čihák, 2007).
2.7.2 Elements
According to Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014:5), a stress test consists of four elements, viz;
(a) the set of risk exposures subjected to stress; (b) the scenario that defines the exogenous shocks
that stress those exposures (c) the model that maps those shocks onto an outcome (or impact)
as well as (d) a measure of the outcome. For instance, if a macro stress test assesses solvency
as measured by capital (outcome), the financial statements of a group of financial institutions
(risk exposures) may be subjected to a recession (the scenario defining the shock) using specified
structural relationships (the model). Stress test modelling requires a clear definition of the scope
of the analysis in terms of objectives, institution coverage, exposures and risk measures (Vukelić,
2011:8).
2.7.3 Exposures and Scope
Although inclusion of the whole financial system is more comprehensive, it runs the risk of
complexity. Therefore, due to data and model limitations, it is common that only a section of
the financial system can be assessed. This approach is supported by Drehmann (2008:67), who
highlights banks’ role of financial intermediation as pivotal to the economy and as such makes
them likely to transfer financial system shocks into the real economy. However, other sectors of
the financial system such as insurance and other financial corporations may also be included
(Čihák, 2007:20). Moreover, stress testing is usually limited to domestic financial system more
especially due to data availability, however, studies, such as Pesaran et al. (2006), have carried
out international macro stress testing by linking asset values in the domestic credit portfolio to
a dynamic global macro model. Exposures to be tested are developed from the objectives of the
stress test. Table 2.1 summarises some common risks which banking institutions can be exposed
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to. Most stress testing studies focus on the credit risk exposure (Schuermann, 2014:722). Some
studies, nonetheless, do account for other exposures such as (Drehmann, 2008) who considered
interest rate risk and (Čihák, 2007) who created a hypothetical banking system to analyse
several risk exposures including credit, liquidity, market and contagion risks. Contagion risk can
also be found in studies such as (Barnhill, Papapanagiotou & Schumacher, 2002; van den End,
Hoeberichts & Tabbae, 2006).
Table 2.1: Some common risks assessed in the stress testing process
Credit Risk The risk of losses arising from a counterparty’s fail-
ure to meet his contractual obligations.
Liquidity Risk The risk that an institution will be unable to meet
its obligations as and when they fall due without
incurring any significant losses.
Market Risk The risk of losses in both on- and off-balance sheet
exposures due to changes in market prices inter alia;
interest rate, foreign exchange rate and commodity
prices).
Contagion Risk The risk that the failure of one or more institutions




The risk of losses as a result of uneven distribution
of exposures to an institution’s debtors, sectoral or
product-wise.
Source: (Čihák, 2007:26-42; Committee of European Bank Supervisors [CEBS], 2010:31-47)
2.7.4 Measures of Risk
The choice of the risk measures is determined by the objectives of the stress testing and the
considered exposures. Vukelić (2011:13) and Čihák (2007:14) indicate that a risk measure should
fit two requirements; produce a variable to measure the financial system’s health and create a
credible linkage between the financial system and macroeconomic risk factors. For example, FSIs
designed to measure the health of the financial sector, corporations as well as household sector of
a given country (Sundararajan et al., 2002:2). Using data obtained from financial statements, the
ratios provide an indication of financial health in terms of capital adequacy, profitability, asset
quality, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk (IMF, 2006:155). Table 2.2 shows the core set
of FSIs, which should be computed by all IMF member countries as well as the encouraged set
which includes supplementary, non-compulsory indicators that extend beyond deposit takers to
cover other economic sectors such as households, financial and non-financial corporations as well
as the real estate market.
Čihák (2007:14) also provides an overview of other risk measures commonly used in stress testing
as follows;
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TABLE 2.2. List of FSIs relating to the banking sector
FSI Code Core FSIs for Deposit Takers
I01 Regulatory capital to risk-weihted asssets
I02 Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
I03 Common equity Teir to riskwighted assets (Solvency Ratio)
I04 Capital to assets
I05 Non-performing loans net of provisions to capital
I06 Non-performing loans to total gross loans
I07 Provisions to non-performing loans
I08 Secotral distribution of loans to total loans
I09 Return on assets
I10 Return on equity
I11 Interest marging to gross income
I12 Non-interest expenses to gross income
I13 Liquid assets to total assets
I14 liquid assets to short term liabilities (liquidity coverage ratio will replace this measure when Basel 3 is fully adopted)
I15 Available amount of stable funding to required amount of stable funding (Net stable funding ratio)
I16 Net open position in foreign exchange to capital
Additional FSIs for Deposit Takers
I18 Large exposures to capital
I19 Georgraphical distribution of loans to total loans
I20 Gross asset position in financial derivaties to capital
I21 Gross liability position in financial derivatives to capital
I22 Trading income to total income
I23 Personnel expenses to non-interest expenses
I24 Spread between references lending and deposit rate (base points)
I25 Spread between highest and lowest interbank rates (base points)
I26 Customer deposits to total (non-interbank) loans
I27 Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans
I28 Foreign-currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities
I29 Credit growth to private sector
Source: (International Monetary Fund, 2006:155)
• Capital, capitalisation and capital injection - The impact of a shock on solvency usually
results in changes in capital. Using capital as a risk measure is advantageous because the
variable is easily accessible and publicly available;
• Profits and profitability - During periods of financial distress, a bank’s profit can be consid-
ered as the first line of defence against losses and before capital is engaged. Accordingly, it
is useful to express the impact of a shock based on a bank’s profits in addition to capital.
The main difficulty with this approach is that information on the distribution of profits,
for instance, pertaining to treatment of retained earnings may not be publicly disclosed
resulting in estimation using historical values;
• Ratings and probabilities of default (PDs)- These allow for a combination of solvency and
the liquidity risks into a single measure. The indicators are useful as they translate the
changes in variables into the changes in ratings allowing for the impact on PDs to be
estimated by linking ratings with a bank’s chances of going bust.
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2.8 Stress Testing Techniques
There are two main stress-testing techniques, sensitivity testing and scenario analysis. Sensitivity
tests assess the impact of a short-term change in a specified risk factor without necessarily
indicating the reasons for such movements (CGFS, 2000:6; CEBS, 2010:11). Despite being
relatively quick and easily applicable, sensitivity tests may lack historical and economic content,
and this can limit their usefulness in longer term risk management decisions. Scenario analysis
on the other hand, carries out a "what-if" analysis by specifying the shocks that might affect,
simultaneously, a number of market risk factors (Dowd, 2002:4). Scenarios may be historical or
hypothetical. This is discussed further under scenario design.
2.9 Limitations and Challenges
The shortcomings of the current stress testing methodologies have been extensively discussed in
the studies by, among others; (Sorge & Virolainen, 2006; Čihák, 2007; Drehmann, 2008; Borio &
Drehmann, 2010; Borio, Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014). Two main sets of limitations stand out;
the technical and contextual aspects as elaborated below. Other shortcomings are also discussed.
2.9.1 Technical (Modular) Limitations
Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014:9) contend that models tend to perform worst precisely
during conditions of financial distress especially given that these episodes are rare and data
availability is poor, which limits the degree of statistical confidence. As shown by Alfaro and
Drehmann (2009:34), and contrary to popular belief, financial crises do not begin after output
has collapsed, but rather before it contracts significantly. Similarly, work by Drehmann, Borio
and Tsatsaronis (2012:2) also suggests that crises tend to begin at the peak of the medium-term
financial cycle, not during the depth of the bust. This highlights the need for regular stress testing
and not necessarily during periods of financial distress. Breuer and Summer (2013:77) also posit
that most model structures do not incorporate the effect of feedbacks, such as credit tightening by
banks following a recession, even though they are the root cause of financial instability. This may
result in econometric errors and model risk which may provide a false sense of security and an
underestimation of risk. Finally, Borio and Drehmann, (2010:22) do point out that sometimes the
size of a stress test shock must be very large to get any action in a model for identifying serious
vulnerabilities.
2.9.2 Contextual Limitations
Borio and Drehmann (2010:9) discuss an unusual observation where the system tends to look
strongest at its most vulnerable stage thereby inducing aggressive risk taking by banks and
reluctance by supervisors. Likewise, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009:3) found that booms are also
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associated with a proliferation of financial innovation, however, because of lack of historical data
on new products and their performance, there tends to be an underestimation of their potential
resultant risk. These are possible reasons why macro stress tests are often incapable of capturing
vulnerabilities before they manifest into a crisis, as similar observations were made by Ong and
Čihák (2010:21) in their analysis of the failed stress tests of the Icelandic banking system before
the global financial crisis. In terms of behavior, Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014:12) posit
that even if stress tests were successful in identifying potential vulnerabilities, policymakers
would find it hard to take them seriously especially given that market confidence is usually
at its highest and prudence at its lowest in pre-crisis periods. Furthermore, there is extensive
reliance on the judgement and experience of risk managers without any guarantee that they
will interpret the results effectively (Dowd, 2002:165). Lastly, Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis
(2014:14) consider stress tests as better tools for crisis resolution and not for prediction purposes,
arguing that once the crisis has already emerged sources of vulnerability become apparent and
as such can be easily stressed.
2.9.3 Other Limitations
2.9.3.1 Data Availability
Severe historical events are rare which often makes the use of available historical data not entirely
relevant. This means that the model needs to be adjusted with additional assumptions that rely
on expert judgement or a data generating process (Drehmann, Borio & Tsatsaronis, 2012:7).
Moreover, necessary data may not be available for public consumption, for example, some client
information may be regarded as confidential (Drehmann, Sorensen & Stringa, 2010:726). Other
data may not be comparable among firms. Unavailability of data often leads to aggregation, which
also presents a methodological challenge and introduces aggregation bias where parameters
estimated at a macro-level deviate from the true underlying micro parameters (Hale, Krainer
& McCarthy, 2015:3). Furthermore, measuring the capital adequacy of a financial system with
data that is combined, may not reveal vulnerabilities that are bank-specific from the perspective
of individual banks who understand their exposures in greater detail. Finally, because big,
insolvent institutions are more likely to cause systemic disruptions due to the contagion effect,
size weighted averages may then be employed to account for the systemic importance of banks
(Tabak, Fazio & Cajueiro, 2013:3856).
2.9.3.2 Endogeneity of Risk
The endogeneity of risk can result in a disproportionate response to exogenous shocks. Drehmann
(2008:77) found three sources of endogenous risk in stress tests. Firstly, is the endogenous
behaviour of market agents, for instance, banks make an effort to control losses from a crisis
through hedging or realigning portfolios. Secondly, liquidity risk may result in a bank run,
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particularly for weak banks, due to panic in the market as a result of shocks. Finally, macro
feedbacks -how the macro economy affects the financial system and the second-round effects -
how the financial system affects the economy, should also be considered. Because market agents
respond differently to shocks, it often becomes complex to determine all the feedback costs in
addition to the amount necessary to restore banks to minimum capital adequacy.
Other common administrative limitations include; time or resource constraints, a high com-
putational cost for structural models as well as a lack of expertise (CGFS, 2000:3). Nevertheless,
even with these limitations, historical experience has shown that macro stress tests are useful,
because they provide a quantitative measure of the vulnerability of the financial system to
different shocks, which can be used with other analyses to draw conclusions about the overall
stability of the financial system (Blaschke et al., 2001:44).
2.10 Methodological Approaches to Stress Testing
2.10.1 Bottom-up vs. Top-Down Approach
Bottom-up stress testing is when a supervisory authority provides assumptions about possible
future economic conditions and allows banks to use their own internal models to carry out
stress tests and report the results to the supervisor. The top down approach, on the other hand,
entails supervisors designing scenarios and actually conducting the stress tests (Čihák, 2007:12;
Borio, Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014:7). Often times, authorities combine the two approaches by
comparing bottom-up exercises with top-down evaluations. The combination approach was applied
in both the SCAP and the CEBS stress testing programs in the US and Europe, respectively
(Borio, Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014:7). Haldane (2009:15) distinguishes between the two
approaches by indicating that the top-down approach provides information on the overall impact
of shocks as well as their distribution throughout the system which aids in understanding the
potential contagion effects on financial stability. It also uses same assumptions and procedures
across board making comparisons easier. The major disadvantage of the top-down approach is
that it can lead to the loss of some relevant information such as overlooking data which may be
confidential or too complex. Contrastingly, the bottom-up approach can capture such information
better as it would be the banks themselves who provide the detailed information. The main
disadvantage is, however, that banks do not necessarily use the same models which hampers
comparability and benchmarking (Vukelić, 2011:9).
2.10.2 Scenario Design
Berkowitz (1999:8) outlines four types of scenarios as follows; (a) those that simulate the shocks
that are likely to happen than historical data suggests; (b) those that work with shocks which
have never occurred; (c) those that simulate shocks which may result in defiance of statistical
patterns due to structural differences of financial systems and (d) those that simulate the shocks
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that express possible future structural breaks such as a change in the exchange rate regime.
A scenario can be formulated by relying directly on historical episodes of financial crises or
alternatively, using judgement (Dowd, 2002:168). Historical scenarios are easier to articulate and
reasonable and as such appear more credible because the hypothesised event actually happened
in the past. The downside to using historical scenarios is that scenario selection is usually based
on past developments in the market and/or business segment. This creates a tendency to focus
on past events and not future dangers. As such, there is an increased chance that a firm may
adopt risk management that is based on past shocks rather than future risks that do not have
an exact historical parallel (CGFS, 2000:3). Moreover, the number of usable historical scenarios
is limited as stress events are rare by definition. Further, scenarios may be difficult to apply to
products that did not exist at the time of the historical event in question (James, 2012:173). By
contrast, (Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014:5) suggest that hypothetical scenarios avert
the tendency to pay more attention to past events than potential future occurrences. However, the
major problem with the latter is the difficulty in formulating sensible and easily apprehensible
scenarios.
As discussed in Čihák (2007:48), scenario design can adopt two approaches, the worst-case
approach and the threshold approach. The worst-case approach formulates a scenario with
the worst likely impact whereas the threshold approach identifies the most plausible scenario
that would lead to a specified impact. Historical experience is often used to judge plausibility
of the scenario. Scenarios may also be developed through a data generating process of which
Drehmann (2008:73) has identified four main methods namely; (a) the calibrated distributions
of the unobserved factors; (b) the autoregressive processes for each underlying macro variable;
(c) the reduced form vector autoregressive macro models and (d) the structural macro models.
Borio, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis, (2014:3) do note an observation that scenario design becomes
a difficult exercise particularly when used to uncover vulnerabilities during tranquil times.
Caggiano, Calice and Leonida (2014:262) also provide three groups of explanatory variables
that may be used in scenario design for stress testing as follows;
• Banking system characteristics such as foreign exchange net open position, liquidity
position and leverage should be taken into consideration. A negative foreign exchange net
open position signals substantial potential losses should the domestic currency fall in value.
Further, a high deposit turnover increases liquidity risk especially in cases where sources
of funding for banks are limited (IMF, 2012:8). Lastly, the ratio of aggregate equity to total
assets can be used to assess the ability of a bank, with a deteriorating capital position, to
absorb unexpected losses (Caggiano, Calice & Leonida, 2014:262).
• Macroeconomic fundamentals including real GDP growth, inflation and nominal exchange
rate depreciation. Economic performance has an effect on the ability of borrowers to meet
their obligations and thus affects the quality of credit in the banking system. This is
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especially the case for developing countries, as the relatively low economic diversification
leads to a concentration of banks’ exposures such that a shock to the dominant sector of
the economy may become of systemic importance (Narain, Rabanal & Byskov, 2003:17).
Further, a nominal depreciation of the exchange rate is likely to destabilise the banking
sector especially if it is heavily exposed to foreign exchange risk.
• Monetary conditions including growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio and broad money cover of
international reserves. Moreover, excessive credit growth can result in high credit risk in
instances where there is a decline in asset quality, and thereby increasing the likelihood
of a banking crisis. Finally, the credit-to-GDP ratio was adopted as a common reference
point under Basel III to guide the build-up of countercyclical capital buffers (Drehmann &
Tsatsaronis, 2014:55).
2.11 Conclusion
The negative events that financial sector supervisors seek to guard against are difficult to pre-
dict. For instance, the global financial crisis which exposed the weaknesses in the Basel capital
framework. This study draws motivation from Wall (2014), as the author strongly contends
that macro stress testing helped restore confidence in the financial sector following the failure
or close calls for several financial institutions in the crisis. Stress testing itself is not without
criticism, stemming particularly from its extensive use of personal judgement and to some extent,
complexity (Dowd, 2002:165). However, the positive outcomes of macro stress testing have been
observed, for instance Bernanke (2013:1) described the SCAP as a "critical turning point" in the
financial crisis which helped restore confidence and enabled recapitalisation in banks in the US.
The literature also indicates that the African banking system generally remained resilient during
the financial crisis, with most banks holding strong CARs. However, the literature is limited in
terms of the use of stress tests in supervisory risk assessment in Africa except for the IMF FSAP
stress testing program, which is also only being carried out only in select African countries. This
is despite Jakubík and Schmieder (2008:3) having established that stress events tend to leave
a significant impact in less developed economies. Moreover, the suboptimal performance of the
Basel regulations during the financial crisis may be regarded as an indication that they are not
entirely a reliable measure of financial institutions’ health, especially when considered on their
own. With a focus on Botswana, this study will apply stress testing to the banking system and
compare capital adequacy as determined by the stress test, with the Basel-based capital adequacy.
The main postulation is that the financial system vulnerabilities of African countries are unique
and possibly vaster to be only determined by the Basel ratios. The nature of most economies is
such that they are resource dependent and concentrated thus increasing the perceived fragility.
According to Quagliariello (2009:6), the more fragile the system, the more severe the effects
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of exogenous shocks. This study will help improve understanding of the Botswana financial
system vulnerabilities and fragility as well as contribute to the literature on the stress testing












As with several other countries, the Botswana banking system constitutes a significantportion of the financial system. Botswana has never had a severe banking crisis andinstances of problems have been handled without compromising the integrity of the
banking system (Jefferies & Tacheba, 2010:10). As part of prudential supervision, the central
bank, Bank of Botswana (BOB) subscribes to the Basel Standards. Basel II was implemented in
January 2016, and prior to that, Basel I had always been the basis for determination of adequate
capital for banks. Botswana currently has 10 privately owned commercial banks. In addition,
there is government owned development bank, building society and savings bank. The study,
however, is restricted to commercial banks only. This is because of their private ownership and
the associated higher default risk relative to the government owned institutions which have
an implicit government protection (Iannotta. Nocerra & Sironni, 2013:154). Furthermore, the
banking system is dominated commercial banks with 91 percent of total banking industry assets
(Bank of Botswana [BOB], 2016:4).
3.2 Banking Sector Risk Profile
The Botswana economy, like the rest of the world economy, was negatively affected by the global
financial crisis, whose effects can be regarded as a form of stress test on the banking sector.
Although it was overall described as resilient and sound during the period (BOB 2010:1), the
banking system did experience some indirect effects in two ways. Firstly, Botswana banks are
subsidiaries of international banking groups which, subsequent to the crisis, tightened their
credit criteria and reduced risk appetite which affected new credit approval (Jefferis & Tacheba,
2010:32). Secondly, the economy faced rationalisation and even closure of some mining projects,
postponement of other key economic projects as well as a general slack in the real economy of
4.6 percent in 2009 (Ntsosa, 2011:60). The resultant government cutback on fiscal spending had
a bearing on businesses that rely on government-supported activities and ultimately banks, as
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could be seen in the substantial increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) at the time.
Table 3.1 provides a summary of banking performance in terms of key FSIs from which breaches
of prudential standards have been highlighted to provide indication of risk prone aspects of the
banking system.
TABLE 3.1. Key FSIs and prudential standards for commercial banks 2012-2016
 
KEY FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS & RANGE OF PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS 2012-2016
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Capital Adequacy ≥15 17.3 - 24.2 16.2 - 24.3 16.1 - 23.1 16.4 - 31.0 16.3 - 20.8
Liquid Asset Ratio ≥10 12.4 - 51.4  12 - 36 10.5 - 19.6 2.9 - 28.6 10.3 - 36.5
Profitability (ROA) Positive 0.9 - 4.5 0.7 - 4.0 0.2 - 3.8  (1.0) - 2.7 0.2 - 3.3
Profitability (ROE) Positive 9.2 - 39.1  6 - 32 2.1 - 27.7 (6.4) - 21.4 2.7 - 29.2
Asset Quality (NPL/TL) ≤2.5 1.7 - 14.4 0.6 - 11.6 0.6 - 11.8 0.6 - 8.4 0.8 - 5.9
Range for Commercial Banks
Prudential Standard (percent) 
Financial Indicator
Source: (Bank of Botswana, 2017: 26)
In the last five years, the banks remained adequately capitalised, however with some threats
visible in liquidity and asset quality. As at December 2016, all banks were able to meet the
15 percent and 4.5 percent minimum capital requirements for total and common equity Tier 1
capital ratios, respectively, even following the introduction of the Basel II regulatory capital re-
quirements in 2016. The CAR averaged 19.4 percent in December 2016 with a 12 percent growth
in risk-weighted assets to P52.3 billion under the new standard. The banking sector assets have
increased steadily over the years to P80.7 billion in December 2016, signalling improved financial
strength. Total loans also increased to P51.3 billion in December 2016, even though accompanied
by an increase in the NPL/Total loans ratio from 3.9 percent in 2015 to 4.9 percent in 2016. The
household sector accounted for 52 percent of total NPLs, showing increased vulnerability in
terms of credit risk concentration. The heavy exposure to unsecured household debt in the local
financial system poses a threat to asset quality particularly in periods of tightened monetary
policy (Delis & Karavias, 2015:15).Figure 3.1 provides a graphical analysis of the performance of
the commercial banks based on key indicators.
Profitability also improved in December 2016 with after-tax income increasing by 22.9 percent
to P1.4 billion in December 2016. Overall, the banking sector met all the minimum statutory
requirements in December 2016. However, asset quality, earnings and liquidity are observed to
be partially inadequate as per the CAMELS ratings12 in Figure 3.2.
12Generated using an off-site supervisory rating system that assesses banks’ performance based on capital adequacy,
asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk.
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Growth rates: Household Loans vs Total Loans










Concentration: Sectoral Distribution of Loans
Source: (Author’s computations based on data from Bank of Botswana)
FIGURE 3.2. Summary of CAMELS ratings for commercial banks in Botswana 




SUB-CATEGORY B1 - Upper B1- Lower B2 - Upper B2- Lower B3 - Upper B3- Lower B4 - Upper B4- Lower
SCORE 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
RISK RATING Low Medium Medium High High
Strong Adequate Partially Adequate Weak
Band 1 Band 2 Band 3 Band 4
Source: (Bank of Botswana, 2016: 30)
3.3 Macroeconomic Risk and the Banking System
The discovery of diamond mining, following independence in 1966, catapulted the economy of
Botswana to hold the record as the fastest growing economy in the world for over a decade in
the 80s (Malema 2012:52). As the country thrived on having a democratically elected govern-
ment, mining continued to contribute tremendously to the GDP, translating into high economic
growth rates. To date, the Botswana economy is still dependent on diamond mining despite the
long-standing efforts to diversify the economy, a matter that continues to be reiterated in the
National Development Plan13. Considering the economic status, it can be postulated that the
13See in (Botswana Government, 2017)(available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/
0BzYE5YZqKfVKQmZwbWZWTzZWR1E/view
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economy harbours risks that can potentially spill over to the financial system. This is because
economic concentration leaves the government budget and balance of payments largely dependent
on commodity prices which are vulnerable to sustained fluctuations in international demand.
According to Sekwati (2010:79), international experience indicates that economic diversification
is a mammoth task as structural changes are usually slow to implement particularly for resource
dependent countries like Botswana where the dominant resource is poorly linked to the rest of
the economy. In this regard, lack of economic diversification poses as a threat to the stability of
Botswana’s financial system.
Between 2005 and 2015, mining constituted between 35 percent and 41 percent of GDP (BOB
2016:67). Table 3.2 draws a distinction between mineral and non-mineral revenue in Botswana.
Although the latter only accounts for about a third of total revenue, the economy remains sluggish
towards diversification (Sekwati, 2010:79). As observed in Table 3.3, in 2016, diamonds alone
accounted for 86.4 percent of Botswana’s total exports, up from 82.8 percent the previous year.
These figures are an indication of the high dependence on diamonds for generation of foreign
currency revenue (Harvey, 2015:830).
TABLE 3.2. Mineral and non-mineral revenue in Botswana
Source: (Bank of Botswana, 2017:80)
Moreover, with an unemployment rate of 20 percent, Botswana has one of the highest levels in
the region (Statistics Botswana, 2013:36). The spate of job losses in recent years which resulted
from the closure of several companies is also expected to cause strain for some individuals and
companies and thus affecting their reimbursement potential (BOB 2017:92). Notably is the
liquidation of the state-owned, BCL Limited and its subsidiary Tati Nickel Company in 2016,
which were the country’s biggest copper and nickel mines, respectively. These developments have
raised credit risk concerns for banks, as they have 65 percent of their household exposures as
unsecured loans. As Fei, Fuertes and Kalotychou (2012:231) have established, there is a strong
28
CHAPTER 3. THE BOTSWANA CONTEXT
TABLE 3.3. Botswana Exports for 2015/16( in BWP mil)
Source: (Bank of Botswana, 2017:86)
correlation between unemployment levels and default risk. In consideration of the high levels
of unsecured lending, the IMF has made a recommendation14 for the stress testing of banks’
lending to the household sector. The aggregate ratio of NPLs to total loans increased from 3.3
percent in December 2015 to 4.9 percent in December 2016 which is almost double the prudential
limit of 2.5 percent.
3.4 Conclusion
Apart from evidence of asset quality deterioration after the crisis, the Botswana banks’ financial
positions were not significantly affected. However, risk in the financial system need not emanate
from the system itself as it may be introduced by a deterioration of the economic conditions.
Gyzicki (2001:18) has found macroeconomic variables to exert a strong influence on bank risk
and profitability by affecting the share of interest payments and real credit growth. The financial
crisis has been used as a reference point to show that because regulatory failures during the
period were linked the serious liquidity and solvency problems that many banks faced (Moschella
& Tsingou, 2013:407), authorities have since been pressured to advance efforts on risk mitigation,
including embarking on the periodic stress testing of their financial systems (Schuermann,
2014:718).












S tress testing is, by nature, a highly statistical exercise and hence the proclivity towardsa quantitative research approach. The study is aimed at establishing the value of stresstesting in the determination of adequate capital for the Botswana banking system. This
is done through a comparison of the CAR for the banking system before and after the stress
test. The result can be used to ascertain additional capital the system needs to stay properly
capitalised. The study has been motivated by the criticism of the Basel capital framework in
its determination of adequate capital for banks prior to and during the financial crisis. Among
other critics is Wall (2014), who contends that by contrast, stress tests are better able to capture
system vulnerabilities by observing performance of banks under downside scenarios, which are
extreme but still plausible.
The model used in this study closely follows the one designed by Čihák (2014), which is described
as suitable for use in less complex financial systems. The model, based on a hypothetical financial
system, focuses on the application of macro stress testing from a supervisory perspective. Some
real-life insight is drawn from Vukelić, (2011) who performed stress testing on the banking
systems of Croatia and Serbia. The latter is important in adding realism to the stress testing
exercise in this study as it was performed on actual financial systems. Any deviation from the
two methodologies will be duly explained.
4.2 Population and Sampling
A population represents a group of people, companies, hospitals, stores, students or anything
that share some set of characteristics (Zikmund, 2003:369). In Botswana, the banking sector
constitutes a significant portion of the financial system. The population for this study is thus,
banks licensed and operating in Botswana. The population sample, however, is restricted to
commercial banks only, licensed in accordance with the Banking Act (CAP 46:04). The commercial
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banks are all foreign owned private entities which are separately capitalised and account for 91
percent of total banking industry asset base in Botswana (BOB, 2016:4).
4.3 Data
The sources of data are the statistical reports from Bank of Botswana and Statistics Botswana,
as at December 31, 2016. In some instances, data will be sourced from the banks’ financial
statements. Some important components of the data include regulatory capital and risk-weighted
assets for computation of both the baseline and adverse CAR; loan book structure for assessing
asset quality as well as sectoral distribution of loans; provisioning and collateral for credit risk
calculation; bond portfolio structure for interest rate risk calculation, net open position in foreign
exchange and foreign currency lending for foreign exchange risk as well as average profits and
standard deviation of profits over time as a reference point for profitability (Čihák, 2014:26).
Using the Microsoft Excel based stress testing model, the parameters are shocked to determine
the resilience of the banks’ balance sheets to unexpected macroeconomic shocks as well as
determine additional capital needed, if any. The financial data is also used to compute FSI ratios,
which measure the operational health of financial institutions (IMF, 2006:1). By observing their
trend over a period of time, FSIs can help to identify financial areas of weakness that require












The stress testing process follows the pattern of; identification of specific vulnerabilities,sensitivity and scenario construction, scenario testing and financial analysis and summaryand interpretation of results (Čihák, 2014:18). The study illustrates this process for the
Botswana banking system. However, it is worth noting that the steps need not be sequential
allowing for necessary review to be carried out as required. The broader stress testing framework
as illustrated in Figure 5.1, seeks to map macroeconomic variables such as GDP, interest rates
and exchange rate into financial sector variables and expressing impact in terms of capital
adequacy and capital injection as a percentage of GDP.
FIGURE 5.1. The stress testing framework
Source: (Čihák, 2014:19)
The model represents a centralised approach where all calculations are carried out at one centre,
for instance, by a supervisory authority. This forms part of the top-down approach to stress
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testing (Čihák, 2014:22). The first part of the model carries out sensitivity analysis on credit,
interest rate, and foreign exchange risks. To augment the individual risk tests, simple liquidity
tests and a scenario analysis are also performed. The impact of the shocks is shown in terms of a
change in the CAR of the system, with interest drawn to incidences where post-stress CAR falls
below the 15 percent statutory requirement for banks in Botswana. In addition, the changes in
capital expressed as a percentage of the GDP represent the macroeconomic costs of the banking
sector losses (Čihák, 2004:8).
5.2 Calibration of Shocks
The shocks used in the study are based on both historical and hypothetical assumptions. Čihák
(2004:25) notes that the size of shocks can be based on past experience, a multiple of the standard
deviation or even a theoretical estimation.
5.2.1 Credit Risk Shocks
The model uses data on asset quality to carry out credit stress tests based on two components;
aggregate increase in NPLs and credit concentration using sectoral distribution of loans.
• Increase in Non-Performing Loans
With this shock, a general decline in asset quality is modelled with the assumption that
all banks will be affected proportionately by an increase in the existing stock of NPLs. An
increase in NPLs is often deducted from the risk-weighted assets (Čihák, 2014:29) with the
additional NPLs represented by an assumed percentage increase on the existing stock of
NPLs. An alternative may be to relate the increase in NPLs to total loans or to the new
performing loans. However, as a rule of thumb, existing NPLs are often regarded as a good
proxy for a bank’s risk management and other future risks (Čihák, 2014:30). Performing
loans can also be a good benchmark as they represent the same loans that may eventually
become compromised. However, the latter may only be necessary for use when there has
been a structural change such as a shift from household to corporate lending rendering
past NPLs not very useful (Čihák, 2014: 29).
Credit assets in banks can be classified into five15 according to performance as pass, special
mention, substandard, doubtful and loss loans. For this model, NPLs are as defined by
15The five classes comprise pass loans which are fully protected by the current sound worth and paying capacity of
the creditor and are regarded as performing according to the contractual terms such as borrower’s overall financial
condition, resources and cash flow, credit history, and character, purpose of the loan and types of secondary sources of
repayment; special mention loans which comprise loans in arrears beyond 30 days but less than 90 days; substandard
loans represents loans past due by 90 days or more but less than 180 days; doubtful loans which exhibit all the
characteristics of substandard loans. However, they possess weaknesses that make collection in full highly questionable
and improbable, based on current existing facts, conditions, and value. Any asset which is past due 180 days or more
will generally be classified doubtful. Loss loans are considered uncollectible that their continuance as bankable assets
is not warranted (D’Hulster, Salomao-Garcia & Letelier, 2014: 8).
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D’Hulster, Salomao-Garcia and Letelier, (2014: 8), to be loans in arrears by more than 90
days and as such comprise substandard, doubtful and loss loans. The impact of this shock
on capital is represented by a decrease in both the initial capital and risk-weighted assets
by the amount of provisioning required to cover the new NPLs.
• Credit Concentration
This shock targets the different economic sectors and seeks to establish how banks are
likely to be affected by the sizes of their credit exposures to these sectors. The increase in
NPLs is assumed to be proportional to a bank’s credit exposure in a particular sector and
the impact on existing capital is represented by the product of the stock of new NPLs from
each sector and the provisioning rate assumed necessary to account for the new NPLs.
5.2.2 Interest Rate Risk
Financial institutions can be exposed to direct interest rate risk when there is a mismatch
in the interest rate sensitivities between assets and liabilities. On the other hand, they can
also face indirect interest rate risk when interest rate changes affect borrowers’ ability to meet
their contractual obligations in terms of creditworthiness and ability to repay the loans (Čihák,
2014:30). In the model, interest rate risk is assessed using duration analysis where banks’ variable
rate assets and liabilities are divided into buckets16 as per their time-to-repricing (Čihák, 2004:3).
The outcome consists of two components; the impact on capital due to the interest rate gap as
well as the impact resulting from the repricing of bonds. The interest rate gap for each bucket
is given by the difference between rate sensitive assets and rate sensitive liabilities (Blaschke
et al., 2001:12). The assumption is that as the bank rate increases this would affect interest
rates on both loans and deposits of banks. The cumulative interest rate gap for one year or less
contributes towards capital if positive or is deducted if negative. In terms of the impact of bond
repricing on capital, the change in the value of banks’ bond portfolio is deducted from capital.
Theoretically, bond value on banks’ portfolios are also expected to decline with an interest rate
increase.
5.2.3 Foreign Exchange Rate Risk
Stress testing this type of risk seeks to capture how exchange rate changes would affect domestic
currency value of assets, liabilities as well as off balance sheet items (Čihák, 2014:31). The effect
can be direct or indirect. Direct foreign exchange risk comes as a result of a bank’s exposure based
on the net open position in foreign currency whereas the indirect risk represents the impact of
foreign exchange positions taken by borrowers on their creditworthiness and repayment ability.
16...only buckets of one year or less have been considered.
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• Direct Exchange Rate Risk
The model uses net open positions in foreign exchange to assess how a shock change in
the exchange rate would affect the capital holdings of banks. To compute the effect on
capital, the initial capital (pre-shock) is reduced (or increased) by the change in the net
open position. The direction of the impact is determined by whether the net open position
is negative or positive as well as whether the exchange rate change is a depreciation or an
appreciation. According to Čihák (2014:32), a depreciation tends to benefit banks that have
a long (positive) net open position in foreign currency than those with a short (negative)
net open position in foreign currency. Further, the central bank imposes limits17 on foreign
exchange exposures which are usually set as a percentage of capital and to some extent,
are able to control the level of this risk in the system.
• Indirect Exchange Rate Risk
An exchange rate change has an effect on credit risk and as such, modelling this risk
involves the assumption that an increase in NPLs is proportional to the amount of foreign
currency loans (Čihák, 2014:32). This means a depreciation would increase the domestic
currency value of the loans thus making it more difficult for borrowers to repay. In the
model, the stress test involves shocking banks’ foreign currency loans with the assumption
that a proportion of them will become compromised and as a result, default. The impact on
capital is represented by the decline in initial capital due to the deduction of the necessary
provisions to cover the new NPLs.
5.2.4 Liquidity Tests
Liquidity stress tests are often used as indicators of the impact of liquidity shortage on banks
particularly in the short run (Goodhart, 2006:112). In the model, this impact is shown in terms
of number of days banks would be able to withstand a liquidity drain without resorting to
external sources including the central bank or other banks. Although not fully comprehensive,
the approach offers an opportunity to stress test liquidity at a preliminary level. This study
carried out two basic liquidity tests; first, a liquidity run that affects all banks uniformly and
relative to the proportion of demand and time deposits. The sizes of the shocks are based on the
proportions of the deposits assumed to be withdrawn each day. Further, they reflect of percentage
of a bank’s liquid asset holdings that can be easily converted to cash each day. The second test
considers the effect of a possible liquidity contagion among banks, with the assumption that the
liquidity drain starts from the weakest banks to the strongest banks. (Čihák, 2014: 35) highlights
difficulty in modelling liquidity risk as liquidity fluctuations are not easy to capture properly
and the necessary detailed and high frequency data may not be as easily disposable, even to
17For banks in Botswana, the net open position per currency for the South African rand, British pound, euro and
US dollar should not exceed 15 percent of its unimpaired capital, the net open position for any other currency should
not exceed 5 percent of unimpaired capital and overall net open position should not exceed 30 percent of its capital.
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regulators. It is also worth noting that the role of the central bank as "the lender of last resort",
confers upon it, some level of control over large liquidity shocks in the market (Allen, Carletti &
Gale, 2009:644).
5.2.5 Scenario Analysis
The use of scenarios in the stress testing exercise allows for the simultaneous application of
shocks involving a combination of several risk factors in order to assess their effect on banks’
capital. This is important in adding practicality to stress testing, as compared to only using
single-factor shocks, because factors are interconnected in the macroeconomic space. For instance,
a change in the nominal interest rate leads to a change in the real interest rate and this has an
effect on NPLs. Therefore, banks would not only be affected directly by the interest rate changes,
but by the subsequent indirect credit risk, although with a time lag. The effect of changes in
solvency and liquidity risks combined in scenario analysis can also be observed through a change
in the ratings and the implied probability of default of banks.
The outcome of the scenario analysis includes the cumulative impacts on capital, of the credit,
interest rate, exchange rate and liquidity shocks that are added together to produce an aggregate
impact. Furthermore, the impact of the scenario on risk-weighted assets comprises of the impact
of increasing NPLs and the resultant provisions from the credit risk shock. Using the post-shock
risk-weighted assets, the amount of capital necessary to satisfy the minimum CAR rule, is
computed as 15 percent of the post-shock risk-weighted assets. Banks that have their actual post
shock capital less than this capital amount necessary to meet the minimum capital requirement,
are regarded as under-capitalised. It cannot be ascertained whether the government would bail
out failing private-owned institutions. However, if it becomes necessary for the government to
intervene, Čihák (2014:24) estimates the amount of capital injection needed using the formula;
I = ρ∗RW A−C
1− qρ i f C < ρ∗RW A (2)
= 0, otherwise
where C is the bank’s existing total regulatory capital, RWA are its existing risk-weighted assets,
I is the capital injection, q is the percentage of the capital injection that is immediately used to
increase risk-weighted assets, and ρ is the regulatory minimum CAR (ρ = 15 percent in the case
of Botswana).
5.3 Indentification of Vulnerabilities
In addition to the determination of adequate capital for the system through a stress testing
process, Čihák (2014:26) also highlights the importance of other risk measures in locating
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weaknesses and risk in the financial system. For instance, the model uses z-scores as a measure
of the probability of becoming insolvent as has also been discussed by (Boyd & Runkle, 1993;
Hesse & Čihák, 2007). (Čihák, 2014:26) defines the z-score as;
z = (k+µ)/σ (3)
where k is the equity capital as a percentage of assets, µ is the average after-tax return as a
percentage of assets, σ represents the standard deviation of the after-tax return on assets as a
proxy for return volatility.
Furthermore, a supervisory early warning system can be used to generate FSIs and rankings to
be used to identify institutions that require increased supervisory attention (Sahajwala & van
der Bergh, 2000:7). The ranking system also helps in creating a link to the probability of default
or technical insolvency, when a bank’s capital adequacy falls below the regulatory minimum
requirement (Čihák, 2014:27). (Jones, Hilbers & Slack, 2004: 6) posit that for a more efficient
use of resources and time, it is important to tailor the exercise to identified weak points in the
financial system. Narrowing the focus allows for a more advanced and comprehensive analysis of
identified inherent vulnerabilities in the system.
5.4 Formulation of Assumptions and Shocks
5.4.1 Credit Risk
Loan impairements in the financial sector increases the possibility financial difficulty and un-
profitability. Banks usually have a high level of impaired loans before the bankruptcy. Therefore,
a large amount of bad loans in the banking system generally results in a bank failure. (Ahlem &
Messai, 2013: 852). FSAP stress tests often assume a growth in NPLs of between 5 percent and
30 percent. According to BOB (2009:5), NPL growth for Botswana banks reached 53 percent in
2009 following the global financial crisis. This is well above the maximum for the FSAP range.
As such, using the crisis figure as a yardstick, an increase of 60 percent in NPLs is assumed.
Čihák (2014:30) indicates that a high growth rate can be used to reflect the indirect credit risk
that comes as a result of interest rate and exchange rate shocks which affect credit quality.
A high growth rate in NPLs may also reflect the increased credit risk relating to household
loan concentration which was 60.4 percent of total loans in December 2016. In order to test the
system’s ability to withstand any shock that may result from concentrated household lending, a
30 percent shock is used to represent a one-time increase in NPLs of the household sector.
Further, to accommodate the possible default of other key sectors of the economy such as mining
and trade, an assumed increase in NPLs of 5 percent is used across board. This is because the 40
percent remainder of the loan book is regarded as reasonably diversified among the rest of the
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sectoral counterparties. For credit risk, the ratio of NPLs to total loans is used as proxy to signify
the relationship between a deterioration in credit quality and overall credit.
5.4.2 Interest Rate Risk
Some prudential propositions previously made include; a parallel up and down change in interest
rates by 100 basis points, an adjustment of the slope of the yield curve by 25 basis points or
parallel changes in the volatilities of the three-month yield by 20 percent of the current levels
(Derivatives Policy Group, 1995); a standardised interest shock of 200 basis points (BCBS, 2004);
a 200 basis point parallel shift in the yield curve, based on 1974-1994 data (U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank examination manual); and an interest rate shock range of between 50 and 300 basis
points has been used for the FSAP stress tests (IMF, 2003). On account of insufficient data,
particularly on asset and liabilities maturities, a shock of 150 basis points increase in interest
rates is considered reasonable against these general guidelines. Moreover, it is important to
note that between 2007 and 2016, changes in the bank rate in Botswana have not exceeded 100
basis points at any single time, hence, an increase of 150 basis points seems extreme enough yet
realistic.
5.4.3 Exchange Rate Risk
In terms of prudential recommendations, the FSAP uses a range between 10 and 50 percent for
exchange rate shocks while the Derivatives Policy Group (1995) recommends at least 6 percent
shock for main world currencies and 20 percent for all the others. In May 2005, the exchange
rate system in Botswana was changed from an adjustable peg to a crawling peg coupled with a
Pula depreciation of 12.5 percent to improve export competitiveness (Motlaleng, 2009:105). The
adjustable peg allowed for officials to make discrete changes in the exchange rate as deemed nec-
essary. In contrast, the crawling peg ensures small and continuous adjustments of the exchange
rate. Motlaleng (2009:110) found that since the adoption of the crawling peg mechanism, the
Pula has been depreciating with minimal variations making it favourable for an economy which
depends, to a significant extent, on export revenue.
The risk in the depreciations has, however, been noted by Taye (2011:11) who theorises that
the constant depreciation of the Pula should be carefully monitored to avoid the problem of
elasticity pessimism, where low elasticity between imports and exports results in a depreciation
not sufficiently increasing exports or decreasing imports. This may result in a falling trade
balance and no significant increase in export revenue whereas the import bill is rising. Taye
(2011)’s postulation is important as it presents an angle of indirect exchange rate risk that may
not be obvious. However, because the crawling peg mechanism makes it unlikely that an exchange
rate shock may occur, the assumed shock is a sudden depreciation of the Pula against the US
dollar by 10 percent which corresponds to the lower bound of the FSAP approach.
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5.5 Conclusion
The model’s main inputs are the financial statistics from the balance sheets and income state-
ments of banks. The main output of the model is the specification of the impact of shocks on
the CAR as well as the amount of capital necessary to meet the minimum capital adequacy
requirement of 15 percent. The major strength of the model is that it is relatively comprehensible
and flexible with assumptions and shocks easily adjustable. Further, it also covers more than one
risk exposure. Nonetheless, the model requires numerous assumptions and the mechanism for
generation of shocks is left unspecified. This leaves the reliability of stress test results largely












This section presents the outcome of the stress test of the Botswana banking system usingcredit, interest rate and foreign exchange risk sensitivities. The aim is to determinewhether the banking system holds sufficient capital through a comparison of CAR under
baseline conditions (as at December 2016) and after the system undergoes some form of stress
owing to a sudden change in certain macroeconomic variables. The outcome helps determine
whether the amount of regulatory capital available in the system would be enough to absorb the
assumed shocks and still be able to meet the stipulated regulatory capital requirement of 15
percent. Over and above the aforementioned tests, a simple liquidity test and scenario analysis
have been carried out to further observe the resilience of the banking system to unexpected
changes in macroeconomic factors.
6.2 Sensitivity Tests
6.2.1 Stress Testing for Credit Risk
6.2.1.1 Increase in Non-performing Loans
This shock helps project the consequences of an event such as an economic recession on banks’
impaired loans. An assumed blanket increase of 60 percent in NPLs can reduce the average
system CAR by 0.6 percent to 18.8 percent, with no bank breaching the 15 percent threshold. The
sensitivity of the CAR to an increase in NPLs was further tested with a 100 percent increase
in the NPLs which still produced a slight decrease in the average CAR to 18.3 percent. This
provides an indication that banks may have their NPLs sufficiently provided for as observed
by Bushman and Williams (2015:511), that high loan loss provisions offer a safety net for both
present and future losses. Moreover, another explanation could be that using a standard increase
in NPLs across banks and economic sectors ignores individual banks’ loan profiles as well as
sectoral credit concentration. Even though the outcome shows that the NPL/total loans ratio
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would increase from 4.9 percent to 8.0 percent post-stress, the available capital for all banks
would be able to absorb the shock as none of the banks have their CAR fall below the minimum
15 percent.
6.2.1.2 Credit Concentration
As total household credit accounts for at least 60 percent of commercial banks’ loan book in
Botswana, this is a sign of credit concentration. A sudden increase in household NPLs, alone, by
as little as 15 percent is likely to result in at least one bank breaching the minimum 15 percent
CAR mark. For this shock, however, a 30 percent increase in household NPLs is assumed and the
results show that the system CAR would fall to 15.4 percent, with at least three banks likely to
default the 15 percent threshold. Furthermore, when accounting for other important economic
sectors, also holding relatively large shares of the loan book such as mining, construction, trade
and manufacturing, the CAR drops further to 15.2 percent. For the latter shock, a 5 percent
increase in each sector’s NPLs is assumed. It can then follow that the distribution of loans and
NPLs in the banks’ loan book matters in terms of projection of specific system vulnerabilities.
6.2.2 Stress Testing for Interest Rate Risk
A sudden increase in the nominal interest rate by 1.5 percentage points would affect the systems’
capital in two ways. First, is the repricing effect where the increase in interest rates would result
in a decrease of P96 million in the value of bonds held by banks. This would lead to a fall in the
system CAR of 0.2 percent to 19.2 percent. Second, the results show that the impact on capital
due to the change in net interest income is negligible. As such the CAR would remain unchanged
for the latter shock. Under both components, none of the commercial banks is likely to have their
individual CAR fall below the 15 percent minimum regulatory requirement. It is important to
note that the shock has been applied to all net asset positions including foreign currency assets
since there was no separate data on maturity distribution of domestic and foreign currency assets.
This, by implication, means the shock affects both domestic currency and foreign currency assets
the same way while exchange rates are held constant ( Čihák, 2004:3). If this is the case and
assuming only Botswana interest rates change, the interest rate risk is likely to be less.
6.2.3 Stress Testing for Exchange Rate Risk
6.2.3.1 Direct Exchange Rate Risk
For this shock, the Pula is assumed to depreciate unexpectedly by 10 percentage points against
the US dollar at once. The direct effect is measured using banks’ net open positions in foreign
currency which would result a 2.1 percent decline in the CAR to an average of 17.3 percent.
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6.2.3.2 Indirect Exchange Rate Risk
Although conditions where the local currency falls in value are favourable for Botswana’s export
revenue, mining in particular, the fall should not be too drastic to cripple importing industries
thus affecting their reimbursement potential. In assessing the possible indirect effect of the 10
percent depreciation of the Pula on the creditworthiness of borrowers, a 5 percent increase in both
NPLs and the corresponding provisions is also assumed. The result shows that the average CAR
also declines by 2.1 percent to 17.3 percent. For both instances, although the system CAR remains
above the 15 percent minimum capital requirement, the results further show that at least three
banks would breach this minimum requirement. Nonetheless, the crawling peg exchange rate
system in Botswana is likely to shield the currency from abrupt changes. The limited impact of
an exchange rate shock is shown by the banking system capital adequacy remaining above the 15
percent threshold even under adverse conditions. This, however, does not hold true for individual
banks, the difference owing to the size and direction of their net foreign currency exposures.
6.3 Additional Tests
6.3.1 Liquidity Tests
For the liquidity tests, the assumptions for the proportions of withdrawals are a maximum of 10
and 5 percent for domestic and foreign demand deposits, respectively, as well as a maximum of
3 and 1 percent for domestic and foreign time deposits, respectively. Figure 6.1 indicates that
for the first test relating to a liquidity drain, the system liquidity would remain positive, on
average, for the first two days only. From days 3-5, the system liquidity turns negative, which
automatically translates into a breach of the 10 percent statutory liquidity requirement by some
banks. As can be seen in Table 6.1, not all the banks would survive a liquidity run on their own in
all of the five days. On the first day, all the 10 banks would be able to maintain positive liquidity.
However, on days 2-5 only eight, four, three and one, respectively, would stay liquid. The second
test which considers the effect of the contagion and the potential "flight to safety" that may result
from the assumed bank run, the available liquid assets can sustain eight banks on the first day
only, with the other two having negative liquidity. Thereafter, from day 2 onwards, six banks
would fail the liquidity test with only four staying afloat.
6.3.2 Scenario Analysis
This section of the model has combined the overall impact of the different shocks, in an instance
where the occurrence of one shock could lead to the occurrence of others. This would be as a
result of inter-linkages found between macroeconomic factors. The use of the adverse scenario is
important in showing the perceived vulnerability of the banking system using a combined risk
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FIGURE 6.1. Proportional daily withdrawals and contagion over a 5-day period
 
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
TABLE 6.1. Summary of liquidity tests over a five-day period for the banking system
 
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
approach relative to the individual risk shocks. The pre-shock CAR is 19.4 percent, but would fall
to 18.6 percent following the combined shock as shown in Figure 6.2.
Table 6.2 provides a summary of results of the scenario stress test divided into effects on solvency
and liquidity. The table shows the effect of a collective change in provisions, NPLs, interest rate
as well as exchange rate, that resulted in a decline in CAR from 19.4 to 18.6 post-shock.
Although the adverse scenario shows that the system capital remains adequate after being
shocked, there is indication that not all banks would be able to meet the 15 percent benchmark.
As such using the post stress risk weighted assets, the amount of capital needed to meet the
minimum CAR, can be computed by multiplying the post shock risk-weighted assets by the 15
percent. This amount is then compared against the existing post shock capital holdings, with a
shortfall representing the amount of capital injection needed. As per Table 6.3, this amount is
P22 million, which represents 0.014 percent of the domestic GDP.
Finally, a comparison of risk indicators under baseline (pre-shock) and stress (post-shock) condi-
tions is presented in Table 6.4. The changes in the indicators reveal increased risk in the system
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FIGURE 6.2. Comparison between pre-shock and post-shock CAR
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
TABLE 6.2. Changes in solvency and liquidity under adverse scenario conditions
 
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
under the stressed environment. Some notable indicators include the NPLs to total loans ratio,
which increases from 4.9 percent to 7.8 percent, after the shock. The liquidity ratio also shows a
substantial fall from 20 percent to just 4.5 percent, reflecting the possible effects of a liquidity
run over five consecutive days. For the liquidity test, consideration is only given to liquid assets
available at banks as at December 2016, with the main assumption being that during the five-day
period, banks do not have access to any external source of liquid assets. The adverse scenario
would also affect average bank profitability in terms of after-tax return on assets and return on
equity which slumped from 1.9 percent and 17 percent to 0.6 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively.
Ratings18 based on the different financial indicators are also observed to worsen under the stress
scenario. The CAR maintains a rating of 1 under both baseline and adverse conditions, which is
18Ratings: 1 - low risk, 2 - increased risk, 3 - high risk, 4 - very high risk
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TABLE 6.3. Summary of the post-shock capital needs of the system 
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
an indicator that, on average, the banking system is well capitalised. The system, however, shows
signs of distress in asset quality, profitability as well as liquidity as all the indicators’ ratings
show a negative change from pre-shock conditions as per Table 6.4.
TABLE 6.4. A comparison of pre-shock and post-shock banking system FSIs and ratings 
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
To show the distribution of risk in the system, banks have been divided according to size as per
Table 6.5, where a comparison of the z-score, ratings and probability of default has been carried
out. Figure 6.3 provides a graphical depiction of the change in the indicators under adverse
conditions across different bank sizes. Under pre-stress conditions, large banks have an average
z-score of 15, medium banks 17 and small banks 24. Even though the aftershock average z-score
remains the same for large and medium sized banks it increases slightly to 25, for smaller banks.
The risk ratings for the three bank sizes only show a slight increase, signalling increased risk
should the banking system undergo stressful conditions.
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FIGURE 6.3. The z-score, ratings and probability of default according to bank size
 
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
Of all the three indicators of risk used in this study, the change in the probability of default
under the baseline and adverse conditions is most notable for all the bank size categories. Under
pre-shock conditions, the probability of default is, on average, 5.3 percent, 7.1 percent and 12.3
percent for large, medium and small sized banks, in that order. However, average probability of
default substantially increases to 7.3 percent, 14.5 percent and 15.1 percent for large, medium
and small banks, respectively, following the stress test.
TABLE 6.5. Risk indicator levels per bank size under baseline and stress conditions 
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
6.4 Model Validation
To ensure consistency of the results, a bottom-up stress test has been carried out and the results
have been compared to those of the top-down test. The comparison is specifically of the CAR
under adverse conditions, which is 18.6 percent and 18.8 percent for the top-down and bottom-up
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tests, respectively. The difference is negligible and hence the stress test results are regarded as
consistent.
FIGURE 6.4. Comparison between top-down and bottom-up adverse CAR
Source: Author’s computations based on model output
TABLE 6.6. Bottom-up Stress Test (numbers are in BWP millions, ratios are in percent)












This study carries out a system-wide stress test to assess adequacy of the amount ofregulatory capital available in the Botswana banking system as at December 2016.Capital in banks helps provide a cushion and readily available support during periods
of unexpected adverse conditions. The standard convention in determining adequate capital for
banks has, for a long time, been the Basel capital framework using a CAR. Even though the
international prudential standard for this measure is 8 percent, a 15 percent requirement has
been set for banks in Botswana. The main objective of the study is to assess whether the capital
holdings of banks in Botswana, as determined using Basel ratio, is sufficient enough to withstand
an economic downturn, by subjecting it to a series of stress shocks. The expectation is that the
stress test would reveal system vulnerabilities that may result in shortfalls in the amount of
capital that has been reported as ideal using the Basel capital measure. A decline in post-shock
CAR is regarded as an indication of a knock in the amount of capital available in the system.
7.2 Implication of the Results on the Capital Adequacy of the
Banking System
As at December 2016, the system has, on average, enough capital resources as shown by the
19.4 percent baseline CAR, which is well above the 15 percent requirement. Several scholars,
such as Čihák, (2007:53) and Wall (2014:266) have argued that CAR alone does not capture all
possible macro effects that arise from shocks in the macroeconomy. As a result, this study uses a
stress test to model a potential deterioration of the economy and to observe whether the available
capital would be enough to absorb all the shocks and still meet the required threshold. This is
because past experience, such as in the US during the 2007-9 financial crisis, has shown that it
is possible for banks to meet the minimum Basel capital requirements and still not be able to
withstand certain macroeconomic conditions, counter expectation.
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The stress test results indicate that under most shocks, the system CAR declined but still
remained above the 15 percent benchmark. Although this is a positive sign, there were several
occurrences where not all banks were able to meet the benchmark. This can be attributed to the
high loan impairments or low collateral and loan loss provisioning levels as well as a high credit
exposure in one particular industry, relative to others. Nonetheless, the literature (Hilbers, Jones
& Slack, 2004:1; Borio, Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014:4; Čihák, 2014:18)indicates that if done
well, stress test exercises help to identify specific weaknesses in the financial system. Having
been identified, supervisory resources can be focused on specific areas of concern.
Furthermore, the use of FSIs, ratings and probabilities of default as part of the stress testing
process is also considered necessary as the measures help to direct focus to the weak aspects of
banks performance. The stress tests also confirm that the most vulnerable area for the banks
relates to their credit exposures, particularly to the household sector. This is evidenced by high
non-performing loans against potentially insufficient loan loss provisioning. In terms of interest
rate risk, the low bank rate, which is the benchmark rate, has greatly reduced interest income
for banks, especially when compared to past periods. In terms of foreign exchange risk, the
exposures have been relatively low due to the generally low foreign market activity and plain
vanilla products available in most banks in Botswana. Although liquidity is often contained
and properly managed in the banking system of Botswana, should banks undergo severe stress,
public perception could trigger a bank run that may result in liquidity contagion. This may be
particularly true if a large bank could be affected first. Therefore, the Botswana banking system,
as per expectation, is more exposed to credit risk than either the interest rate or exchange rate
risk. However, Čihák (2012:15) states that because of a large number of individual exposures for
the household sector, it becomes highly unlikely that the majority of loans in the sector could
default on account of a single shock.
Under the adverse scenario, the stress test results also revealed the amount of capital that may
need to be injected into the system to cover the capital deficit. The results show that an amount
of P22 million would be required to ensure that all banks are able to meet the minimum CAR. In
terms of fiscal costs, this amount is equivalent to 0.014 percent of the GDP. The amount can be
raised by the affected bank, failing which, the government may have to step in to prevent a bank
failure. However, government intervention, to a large extent, depends on bank ownership with
state owned banks most likely to be bailed out. For privately owned institutions, the decision
may depend on the importance of a bank in the system. If the failure of a bank is likely to cause





This study, using the CAR as a metric, sought to establish the value of stress testing in the
determination of sufficient capital for banks in comparison to the Basel capital methodology.
Three research questions were posed to address this quest:
a) Are the current CARs for all the 10 commercial banks as determined using the Basel
capital measure sufficient?
The results of the stress test indicate that some banks’ CARs do fall below the 15 percent
minimum requirement when some of their parameters are subjected plausible economic shocks.
For instance, a 30 percent increase in the household sector NPLs is likely to result in at least
three banks defaulting the 15 percent benchmark, while a sudden 10 percent depreciation of the
Pula, would also lead to at least three banks’ CARs falling below the 15 percent requirement.
By deduction, it can be drawn that the available capital for some banks may be insufficient to
withstand a sudden macroeconomic shock, particularly one that results in increasing NPLs.
b) Would stress tests reveal the need for any additional capital in the system?
The shocks adopted under the scenario analysis indicate that the banking system would not be
able to absorb all the shocks with the currently available bank capital and as such, an injection
of P22 million may have to be injected into the system to avoid bank failure.
c) Would supervisory stress tests mitigate the shortcomings of the Basel capital frame-
work in establishing bank capital adequacy in Botswana?
The question aims to highlight what it is that stress tests can do that the Basel CAR cannot. It
can be answered from the viewpoint of the two measures’ ability to account for the level of risk
in a financial institution or the entire financial system. This is because for bank capital to be
regarded as adequate, it should be consistent with the level of risk a bank undertakes or is faced
with. Therefore, as the level of riskiness increases, expectation is that the available bank capital
should be enough to absorb any shock to its balance sheet. However, while the CAR measures
risk based on the credit, market as well as operational risk exposures, macro stress testing
considers the external sources of risk emanating from the economy. This means stress testing
contributes to the comprehensiveness of the process of determining adequate capital for banks
by incorporating macroeconomic shocks that can potentially affect banks’ performance as well
as the subsequent survival of a bank. In this regard, the Basel capital framework helps set the
minimum standard for capital holdings, whereas stress testing identifies specific problem areas,
thus both processes can be regarded as necessary and complementary. For instance, the results
show that the capital holdings of the banking system as at December 2016 are not sufficient as
additional capital of P22 million would be needed for all banks to be able meet the minimum 15
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percent under adverse conditions. This is amid all the banks being able to meet the minimum 15
percent CAR threshold and hence considered adequately capitalised under Basel. In this manner,
since history has shown that meeting the minimum capital requirement is not always enough,












The study investigated the use of stress tests in supervisory risk assessment to overcomethe weaknesses of the Basel capital adequacy measure. The goal of the study has beento observe the inadequacies of the Basel CAR that can be mitigated using stress testing.
The use of the Basel capital adequacy framework has become the prevailing standard for bank
regulators globally. Understandably so, as it standardises the amount of capital that banks need
to set aside as a readily available buffer for periods of financial distress. However, following
the financial crisis, many flaws have been highlighted in both the Basel II and III capital stan-
dards resulting in investors and the public losing confidence in financial regulation. Wall (2014)
argues that the subsequent use of stress tests in the US and EU helped restore market confidence.
8.2 Review of Research Backgroud
The results of the stress test in this study show that the available capital in the Botswana
banking system, (aggregate 19.4 percent CAR, relative to the 15 percent regulatory minimum), is
adequate as it has been able to withstand and absorb macroeconomic shocks as per the assumed
stress conditions. However, this supposition does not discount the value of stress testing in the
determination of adequate capital for banks. This is because unlike the Basel CAR which despite
being specific and accounting for risk through the risk-weighted assets, stress testing assesses
risk by incorporating the effect on capital of possible unexpected changes in the macroeconomic
environment. For instance, the Botswana economy is likely to possess immense risk owing to
its concentrated nature. The use of stress tests, therefore, allows for the explicit linkage of
macroeconomic factors to the amount of capital that banks should hold. Furthermore, stress tests
are also able to estimate additional capital that may have to be injected into the system for it to
be sufficiently capitalised. In light of this, both approaches are necessary and complement each
other in measuring capital adequacy. This complementary role becomes clearer in the aspects of
52
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
the results that show that not all banks would be able to withstand an assumed shock despite
meeting the minimum 15 percent CAR requirement. This reveals the value of stress testing over
the solitary use of the Basel CAR. The latter results support Wall (2014)’s contention that stress
testing can be used to mitigate the shortcomings of the Basel CAR. According to Wall (2014:266),
this is due to the ability of stress tests to capture a deterioration in asset values which the Basel
CAR does not account for and as such tends to produce overstated capital figures.
8.3 Recommendation for Future Work
It remains imperative, nevertheless, that stress testing results be interpreted with caution due
to challenges relating to model construction. In this study, the model that has been used is
relatively basic and intuitive and can be developed further by including more time periods in
order to improve the robustness. Possible future research could consider increasing the range
of shocks covered to include a variation of minor, moderate and major shocks. Furthermore,
the study could be expanded by carrying out a bank by bank analysis, taking into account
systemic importance, which would aid regulators to identify potential problem banks and specific
areas of weakness. The time horizon into the future may also be extended to allow for a full
manifestation of shocks into the deterioration of financial performance of banks. In terms of
the Basel Accord, future research work could consider the implication of Basel III on stress
testing. Finally, this study contributes to the current stress testing literature by testing the
resilience of capital as determined in terms of the Basel capital requirements, under stressful
macroeconomic conditions. This is considered particularly important for a country (Botswana)
that is not frequently considered in international bank stress tests. This makes the framework
available for use in other countries with similar economic structures and where stress testing
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